Same questions, different evidence
SPC bakery affiliates · 2022–2026
Prosecution outcomes vary by defendantFatal entanglement and crushing accidents occurred across SPL, Shany and SPC Samlip. A two-person rule existed in one case; another involved a changed machine without the required risk assessment.
WARNINGPrior injury record, written work rule and equipment-change duties
DECISION AUTHORITYPlant and affiliate management; group-chair liability was separately disputed
MISSING DEFENCEInterlock, staffing coverage and change-risk assessment
LEGAL LIMITDo not merge the chair’s non-prosecution with the affiliate executives’ cases.
Aricell lithium-battery fire · 24 June 2024
Supreme Court proceedings pendingTwenty-three people died, most of them foreign workers. The case exposed evacuation, compartmentation, staffing and safety-training failures alongside a parent–subsidiary management dispute.
WARNINGProduction pressure and hazardous inventory were documented issues
DECISION AUTHORITYParent-company owner-manager, subsidiary management and site command
MISSING DEFENCECompartmentation, escape route, lawful staffing and worker training
LEGAL LIMITFirst-instance sentences and appellate sentences differ; the appeal is not a final judgment.
Safety Industrial fire, Daejeon · 20 March 2026
Investigation; no final judgmentFourteen people died in a factory handling sodium-filled engine valves. Reports described an earlier complaint and worker warnings, but criminal causation and executive liability remain under investigation.
WARNINGPublic complaint and repeated requests concerning fire hazards
DECISION AUTHORITYChief executive, factory management and hazardous-material controls
MISSING DEFENCEInspection response, housekeeping, storage limits and emergency planning
LEGAL LIMITBeing booked is not the same as being charged, convicted or finally sentenced.
Hanwha Aerospace explosions · 2018, 2019 and 2026
2026 investigation ongoingThree explosions at the Daejeon site killed thirteen people in total. Earlier cases produced suspended sentences and corporate fines; the 2026 explosion must be kept separate until its investigation is complete.
WARNINGTwo earlier fatal explosions and a government work-suspension order
DECISION AUTHORITYCorporate management, site leadership and process owners
MISSING DEFENCEWritten process control, ignition prevention and independent safety authority
LEGAL LIMITEarlier judgments do not establish the cause or liability of the 2026 event.
Coupang logistics-centre fires · 2021 and 2026
2026 cause not finalA firefighter died in the 2021 Icheon fire. Everyone escaped the 2026 Incheon fire. The events can be compared for preparedness, but the later ignition source and any legal fault were still unconfirmed at the reporting cutoff.
WARNINGThe 2021 investigation documented delayed sprinkler operation and alarm shutdowns
DECISION AUTHORITYBuilding operation, fire-safety management and corporate investment decisions
MISSING DEFENCEDetection, suppression, compartmentation, evacuation and maintenance
LEGAL LIMITA repeated fire type is a reason to investigate—not proof of the same cause or offence.
How responsibility can move downward
STEP 1Output target or deadline rises
STEP 2Staffing, downtime or equipment spending stays constrained
STEP 3Procedure depends on attention instead of a physical fail-safe
STEP 4A frontline deviation becomes the visible cause
STEP 5Investigators must reconstruct who controlled budget, staffing and stop-work power
This is an investigation template, not a finding that every company followed the same plan. Each arrow requires site-specific documents, testimony and a legal decision.